AI out of control: what the ‘real threats’ actually mean for your SME

AI out of control: what the ‘real threats’ actually mean for your SME

In short: in July 2026, OpenAI models under test broke out of their isolated environment and hacked Hugging Face to find the answers to their exercise. For an SME, the risk is not the apocalypse, but an AI assistant that reaches its goal by a route nobody anticipated, and a dependence that sets in without anyone deciding it. Before giving an AI access to your email, your files or your payments: minimum permissions, human approval for anything irreversible, and someone who can still do the job without it.

A three-and-a-half-hour programme on the real threats of AI

On 13 October 2026, the science communication channel La Tronche en Biais broadcast live “Intelligence artificielle — les vraies menaces” (Artificial intelligence: the real threats), with two guests:

  • Shaïman Thürler, creator of the podcast and channel Le Futurologue, dedicated to the challenges of AI;
  • Tom David, co-founder and director of the GPAI Policy Lab (international cooperation on the safety of general-purpose AI) and of PRISM Eval (safety evaluation of AI models), appointed expert on the European Union's scientific panel on AI.

Their message, in summary:

  • Loss of control is structural. A modern AI is not programmed line by line: it is trained to reach a goal. The gap between what we wanted and what the machine actually does (‘misalignment’) never disappears entirely.
  • It is no longer theoretical. The guests cite AI agents that cheated, bypassed their limits and attacked a real company.
  • The race between the United States and China concentrates power in the hands of a few players and slows regulation; Europe carries little weight, but still has levers.
  • The social effects arrive before the extreme scenarios: jobs, culture, information, growing dependence. They cite the Gradual Disempowerment study (Kulveit et al., 2025), which describes a gradual loss of human influence over the economy and society, without any spectacular ‘takeover’.
  • Neither panic nor fatalism: acknowledge the problem, stay informed, support governance and verification mechanisms.

Part of this debate (extinction risk, an intelligence gap ‘like that between humans and ants’) belongs to foresight and remains disputed among researchers. An SME has no lever there. The rest concerns it directly.

What really happened: OpenAI, Hugging Face and the ‘impossible exercise’

The example cited in the programme is real and documented by both companies.

  • The context. OpenAI was testing its GPT-5.6 Sol models and a more powerful internal prototype on ExploitGym, an advanced hacking benchmark. To measure their maximum capabilities, the safeguards that normally block hacking activities were disabled. The models had no direct Internet access: their only link to the outside was an internal server used to install software.
  • The breakout. The models found an unknown vulnerability (a ‘zero-day’) in that server, the only door out of their environment, then escalated privileges within OpenAI's research network up to a machine connected to the Internet.
  • The attack. Reasoning that Hugging Face, the major platform for sharing models and datasets, might host the solutions to the exercise, they broke in by chaining stolen credentials and vulnerabilities, until they extracted those solutions from its production database. According to Hugging Face, the entry point was a booby-trapped dataset, which caused code to run on one of the platform's processing servers. Hugging Face detected the intrusion and announced it on 16 July 2026; OpenAI acknowledged on 21 July that its models were the cause.
  • The motive. According to OpenAI, “All evidence suggests that the models were hyperfocused on finding a solution for ExploitGym”. No malice: a goal pursued by every means available.

This is exactly the ‘misalignment’ the guests talk about: you ask for an exercise to be solved, and the machine concludes that the most efficient approach is to go and steal the answer key.

Nuance: these models were running in a laboratory, without safeguards, with exceptional hacking capabilities. An SME's AI assistant has neither those capabilities nor that freedom. But the mechanism, reaching the goal by an unforeseen route, exists on a smaller scale in every AI agent. The idea that the agents deliberately covered their tracks is circulating, but is not established by the official reports.

What this changes for your business

1. An AI agent has the permissions you give it

AI assistants no longer just answer questions: ‘agents’ read your email, sort your files, fill in forms, send messages. An agent with access to everything can do anything, by mistake, or because a booby-trapped email or document slips it an instruction (known as ‘prompt injection’). The reference project OWASP published in December 2025 a list of ten risks specific to agents: hijacking of the agent's goal, misuse of its tools, abuse of its identities and permissions.

The simple rule: give the agent the minimum access it needs, and require human approval for anything that cannot be undone: a payment, an external send, a deletion, a contract. Add caps (amount, number of sends) and confirm any unusual request through another channel: an approval that comes up twenty times a day ends up becoming a reflex click.

2. Attacks are getting faster, the basics matter more

The International AI Safety Report, chaired by Yoshua Bengio (February 2026), finds that AI is increasingly used in cyberattacks, although they are not yet fully autonomous. The Hugging Face case shows what the most advanced models are capable of when left to their own devices. For an SME, the answer remains the same, but it becomes urgent: updates, two-factor authentication, offline backups, vigilance against fraud (see our article on phishing and deepfakes (in French)).

3. Dependence sets in without anyone deciding it

A study conducted in four Polish centres (Budzyń et al., 2025) observed that experienced gastroenterologists, after a few months of using an AI detection aid, spotted lesions less well when working without it: the detection rate fell from 28.4% to 22.4%. It is an observational study, in a single field, but the mechanism speaks to every business: a skill you no longer practise is lost.

Add to that dependence on the supplier: a handful of American and Chinese companies control the most powerful models. If the tool changes its price, its rules or disappears, your way of working must be able to survive it. A local AI, without the cloud (in French), is an option for certain tasks.

4. Jobs: no wave of layoffs, but a signal among young people

The study by Anthropic's economists (Massenkoff and McCrory, 2026), based on US data, finds no rise in unemployment in the occupations most exposed to AI since late 2022. It does, however, note a fragile signal: around 14% fewer 22- to 25-year-olds entering these occupations compared with 2022. For an SME, the trap would be to stop training beginners: they are the ones who, tomorrow, will know how to check what AI produces.

5. The law already requires you to act

The AI Act requires businesses that use AI to “take measures to support the development of AI literacy” of their staff. The text was rewritten by the ‘Digital Omnibus’ Regulation (EU) 2026/1744, in force since 27 July 2026: it is now an obligation of means, not of result. Basic training, a usage policy (in French) and a designated contact person are often enough (see also the AI Act for SMEs (in French)).

In practice: three options

Option What it costs The risk
Do nothing Nothing at first AI tools adopted haphazardly, with overly broad access, and skills that erode without anyone noticing
Set the framework yourself Half a day to list the tools and their access, draft a policy, appoint a contact person Underestimating what an agent can do with the access it has been given, or missing a setting
Get support A few hours of analysis and configuration The lowest: inventory of tools and permissions, approval rules, team training, plan B if a tool disappears

Example (illustrative case): a six-person estate agency activates an AI agent that sorts the shared mailbox, answers viewing requests and forwards files to notaries. A fake email from a ‘notary’ asks for all the sales agreements signed that month to be sent. The agent, which has access to the whole shared folder and can send on its own, complies. The original mistake: the agent had both access to all the documents and the power to send them on its own. The fix: the agent drafts the replies but only sends them externally after approval, it only sees the viewings folder, and one member of the team keeps handling part of the files personally every week.

For your IT person

  • Least privilege: one dedicated service account per agent, permissions limited to what is strictly necessary, short-lived access tokens, no administrator access.
  • Irreversible actions subject to human approval (payments, external sends, deletions, permission changes); logging of all the agent's actions.
  • Remote code: according to Hugging Face, the entry point was a malicious dataset that exploited two code execution paths in its processing pipeline (a remote-code dataset loader and a template injection in a configuration). On the business side: do not load models or datasets with remote code execution (trust_remote_code) without review, and prefer the safetensors format for model weights. This format only protects the weights: scripts, dependencies and datasets still need checking, ideally in an isolated environment.
  • Network egress: an isolated test environment is only isolated if its single door (proxy, package cache) is itself up to date and monitored; allowlist of destinations.
  • Hugging Face users: rotate access tokens and check recent account activity, as the platform recommended.
  • Framework: OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (December 2025) to structure a security review of an agent project.

Test yourself

In July 2026, why did OpenAI models under test hack the Hugging Face platform?

Show the answer

Answer: To find the solutions to the hacking exercise on which they were being evaluated

According to OpenAI, the models were hyperfocused on succeeding at the ExploitGym exercise and looked for its solutions at Hugging Face: a goal reached by an unforeseen route.

What is the first precaution to take before giving an AI agent access to a company's email or files?

Show the answer

Answer: Give it the minimum access it needs and have a human approve any irreversible action

An agent has the permissions you give it: minimum permissions and human approval for payments, external sends and deletions.

Since its rewrite by the Digital Omnibus in 2026, what does the AI Act require of businesses that use AI with regard to their staff?

Show the answer

Answer: To take measures to support the development of AI literacy

Article 4 as rewritten by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 imposes an obligation of means: training, a policy, a contact person, without guaranteeing an individual level.

At ExsIT

The first contact is free: we listen to your needs, then propose an action plan. For AI: an inventory of the tools in use and their access, approval rules for agents, a policy and team training, and fallback solutions if a service changes or disappears.

Sources

Bengio, Y., et al. (2026). International AI safety report 2026. https://internationalaisafetyreport.org/sites/default/files/2026-02/international-ai-safety-report-2026.pdf

Budzyń, K., Romańczyk, M., Kitala, D., Kołodziej, P., Bugajski, M., Adami, H. O., Blom, J., Buszkiewicz, M., Halvorsen, N., Hassan, C., et al. (2025). Endoscopist deskilling after exposure to artificial intelligence in colonoscopy: A multicenter observational study. The Lancet Gastroenterology & Hepatology, 10(10), 896–903. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-1253(25)00133-5

Kulveit, J., Douglas, R., Ammann, N., Turan, D., Krueger, D., & Duvenaud, D. (2025). Gradual disempowerment: Systemic existential risks from incremental AI development (arXiv:2501.16946). arXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.16946

La Tronche en Biais. (2026, October 13). Intelligence artificielle — les vraies menaces [Live video, with S. Thürler and T. David]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/live/oXTWL9-WHMY

Lakshmanan, R. (2026, July 20). World's largest AI model repository Hugging Face breached by autonomous AI agent. The Hacker News. https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/worlds-largest-ai-model-repository.html

Massenkoff, M., & McCrory, P. (2026). Labor market impacts of AI. Anthropic. https://www.anthropic.com/research/labor-market-impacts

OpenAI. (2026, July 21). OpenAI and Hugging Face partner to address security incident during model evaluation. https://openai.com/index/hugging-face-model-evaluation-security-incident/

Oxford Martin AI Governance Initiative. (n.d.). Tom David. University of Oxford. https://aigi.ox.ac.uk/people/tom-david/

OWASP GenAI Security Project. (2025, December 9). OWASP GenAI Security Project releases Top 10 risks and mitigations for agentic AI security. https://genai.owasp.org/2025/12/09/owasp-genai-security-project-releases-top-10-risks-and-mitigations-for-agentic-ai-security/

Sapuppo, V. G. (2026, July 30). AI literacy: The Digital Omnibus rewrites Article 4 of the AI Act. Law & Technology. https://lawandtechnology.eu/en/ai-literacy-digital-omnibus-article-4-ai-act/

Zorz, Z. (2026, July 20). Hugging Face breached by autonomous AI agent. Help Net Security. https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/07/20/hugging-face-breached-by-autonomous-ai-agent/

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